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NOTE
WHO IS MY MOTHER?: WHY
STATES SHOULD BAN
POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION BY
WOMEN
Kristin L. Antallt
I. INTRODUCTION
SINCE THE DAY ALEXANDRA CAN REMEMBER, she
had dreamed of a life surrounded by children. While it was not her
only goal in life, having children remained extremely important to
her. Alexandra loved children. She babysat throughout her teen
years, taught first grade, and could not wait to have children of her
own. Shortly after Alexandra married, she and her husband began
talking about having children. However, while Alexandra and her
husband were discussing getting pregnant, Alexandra was diag-
nosed as having cancer. Afraid the cancer treatment would leave
her sterile, Alexandra therefore decided to undergo fertility treat-
ments to have her eggs extracted. The extracted eggs were fertil-
ized with her husband's sperm. The embryos were then frozen for
implantation in Alexandra after the cancer treatment. Unfortu-
nately, Alexandra did not survive the cancer and did not leave any
instructions regarding what should be done with the embryos in the
event of her death. What will happen to the frozen embryos?
Should Alexandra's husband, parents, or friends be given custody
of the embryos in order to carry out Alexandra's wishes to have a
child? What would be the consequences if Alexandra had signed a
consent form leaving the embryos in the care of her husband, with
explicit instructions for him to hire a surrogate to carry their child?
Should Alexandra's wishes to posthumously reproduce be granted?
Posthumous reproduction occurs when a child is born after
one or more of the biological parents have died.1 This Note will
t J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 1999.
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argue in favor of legal prohibition of posthumous reproduction by
women.2 Posthumous reproduction by women involves the ex-
tracting egg from a woman while she is alive, fertilizing it with
sperm, frozen, and subsequently implanting it in a surrogate after
the genetic contributor's death.3 Currently, there are no statutes
prohibiting posthumous reproduction by women, partly because it
is so new, but also because legislatures are reluctant to intrude into
the private lives of individuals, particularly when it involves their
reproductive choices.4
The law has difficulty keeping up with a rapidly advancing
science such as medicine. "[T]he medical profession looks for-
ward, while the legal profession gazes backward." 5 Legislatures
draft laws responding to medical technologies, rather than pre-
dicting them.6 However, most of science, and especially reproduc-
tive advances, are based on evolving technology, merely in the
experimental stage.7 With the legislatures often hesitant to draft
laws relating to something so abstract or uncertain, the result is an
attempt to squeeze new technologies into the confines of existing
laws. "The problem is, we're at the forefront of technology ...
[piroblems crop up that no one has thought of."s Advances in re-
1 See John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1027
(1994) (defining situations where posthumous reproduction can occur and giving an
overview of the potential problems it may create).
2 Posthumous reproduction by men is also possible, and in fact is more feasible
because it involves the implantation of frozen sperm in the wife or girlfriend of the
deceased. However, this Note is going to focus solely on posthumous reproduction by
women. Although this Note proposes legally banning posthumous reproduction by
women, it does not specifically address the issue of whether states should ban all
posthumous reproduction.
3 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 1030 (explaining the scientific technology
enabling posthumous reproduction as well as some of the bioethical dilemmas arising
out of the science).
4 See Barry Brown, Reconciling Property Law With Advances in Reproductive
Science, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 73, 73 (1995) (discussing the reluctance of the
legal system to engage in analysis of property rights with respect to human genetics
and reproduction).
5 Lori B. Andrews, The Stork Market: Legal Regulation of the New Reproduc-
tive Technologies, 6 WHITHER L. REv. 789, 789 (1984) (discussing the chasm be-
tween reproductive technologies and the law).
6 See Karin Mika & Bonnie Hurst, One Way to be Born? Legislative Inaction
and the Posthumous Child, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 993, 993 (1996) (arguing that because
the law merely responds to medicine, more legal complexities arise than might have
otherwise occurred with prompt legislative action).
7 See Brown, supra note 4, at 73 (explaining the avoidance by legal theorists,
legislatures, and courts of analyzing the impact of human reproductive advances on
individual property rights).
8 Lois M. Collins, The Ethics of Creation, DESERET NEws, June 7, 1997, at El
(quoting Dr. Matt Peterson, Director of the Division of Reproductive Endocrinology
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productive medicine are being made every day and legislatures are
now faced with issues previously thought inconceivable. It is diffi-
cult for a legislator to imagine creating legislation involving the
rights of a child who is born after the death of his or her mother.
These are issues a legislature has never before contemplated and
therefore laws are non-existent. Laws are not currently equipped to
deal with the fact that it has become "possible for a child to have
up to five parents: an egg donor, sperm donor, surrogate mother
who gestates the fetus, and the couple who raise the child." 9 The
law must move forward to reflect the changing technologies of the
medical world. Posthumous reproduction by women is medically
possible today, and it is imperative the states take action now.
Posthumous reproduction by women must be banned by state leg-
islation in order to preserve interests and prevent harms.
This Note will explore the changes in reproductive technology
that make posthumous reproduction possible, and the interests af-
fected by those advances. First, Part II.A., includes the history of
reproductive technology in order to explain how posthumous pro-
creation is medically possible. Next, Part II.B., examines cases
involving posthumous reproduction by men. It is necessary to
compare posthumous reproduction by women with posthumous
reproduction by men (i.e. the use of previously frozen sperm of
deceased men), to determine how the courts might interpret a
woman's right to posthumously procreate. Part III of this Note fo-
cuses on the advantages and the disadvantages of posthumous re-
production. There are valid arguments both for and against post-
humous reproduction by women. Weighing and balancing of the
various interests affected by posthumous reproduction by women
are important in determining whether the states have the power to
ban posthumous reproduction. The Note then discusses the con-
stitutional interests at issue to determine if state prohibition is fea-
sible. Procreative liberty and the right of privacy are important
constitutional issues affected by a state ban on posthumous repro-
duction by women. It is important to weigh the state interests
against the constitutional issues in examining the constitutionality
of a state ban on posthumous reproduction by women.
However, in the case of posthumous reproduction, we must
examine the issue further and determine if the constitutional rights
of a woman extend after her death. Generally, states may not
and Fertility at the University of Utah hospitals, in response to the Garber case in
California, regarding posthumous reproduction by a woman who died of leukemia).
9 Andrews, supra note 5, at 791(discussing the medical advances available for
infertile couples). See also Mika & Hurst, supra note 6, at 993 (arguing that the
medical field has advanced technology and created concepts of birth faster than the
law has responded).
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regulate fundamental rights. However, if a state interest is found to
be compelling by the Supreme Court, state regulation of the fun-
damental right is permitted. If posthumous reproduction is not
deemed a fundamental right, state regulation is permitted if the
state interest is important or legitimate. Part IV of this Note ex-
amines whether the fundamental right to procreate extends to re-
production by artificial means or posthumous reproduction. Last,
in Part V, the policy reasons underlying a ban on posthumous re-
production are explored. The welfare of the existing children and
the societal and financial interests of the state are considered in
reaching the conclusion that posthumous reproduction by women
should be legally prohibited.
This Note concludes that the fundamental right to procreate
stated by the Supreme Court does not extend to a woman after her
death. Therefore, the states can, and should, enact laws banning
posthumous reproduction by women.'0 There are multiple argu-
ments both for and against posthumous reproduction by women,
but the detriments far outweigh the benefits, and posthumous re-
production by women should be banned through state legislation.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of Modem Reproductive Technology
Although assisted reproduction has existed for over 200 years,
it has not been addressed by the legal world until recently. The
various processes involved in assisted reproduction have forced
society to face legal issues regarding parental rights and the rights
of children. Currently, however, society is faced with the possibil-
ity of children being brought into the world after the death of their
genetic mother. Before dealing with posthumous reproduction, it is
necessary to look at the different medical advances in assisted re-
production which make posthumous reproduction by women pos-
sible. Artificial insemination, surrogacy, the freezing of sperm, and
in vitro fertilization are all medical advances currently assisting
infertile couples to have children. Today, many people are choos-
ing to wait until later in life to have children, and consequently,
the greater percentage of people trying to get pregnant require the
assistance of reproductive technologies." Thousands of couples
have produced children who otherwise would not have been suc-
10 This Note will not comment on posthumous reproduction by men, except to
the extent that it can be compared to posthumous reproduction by women. See
Brown, supra note 4.
11 See Rick Weiss, Babies in Limbo: Laws Outpaced by Fertility Advances,
WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1998, at Al.
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cessful without the assistance of reproductive technologies. The
possibility of combining these methods makes posthumous repro-
duction feasible. Without the advent of in vitro fertilization com-
bined with surrogacy, posthumous reproduction by women would
be impossible.
Artificial insemination is one of the "oldest and most common
forms of alternative reproduction."1 2 It has been performed on
animals for centuries, with the first successful human case of arti-
ficial insemination being performed in England in 1770.13 Artifi-
cial insemination involves placing the sperm of the husband or a
donor into the woman without intercourse. Artificial insemination
is quick and uncomplicated, as the sperm is injected into a
woman's vagina near her uterus with a syringe. 4 Initially, relig-
ious and moral misgivings relating to such an "unnatural" means
of reproduction halted medical research in this area.15 Today, how-
ever, artificial insemination is widely accepted and hundreds of
thousands of couples have successfully reproduced with the aid of
artificial insemination. The courts have found children conceived
through artificial insemination to be legitimate children, equal to a
naturally conceived child, despite the fact that the husband of the
woman may not be the biological father of the child. 16 When artifi-
cial insemination is used, both parents are living and the procedure
is relatively simple and inexpensive.
Moreover, in the mid-20th century, an Italian scientist discov-
ered sperm could be successfully frozen for future use. 17 Originally
men going to war had their sperm frozen for future use by their
12 Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, From Cradle to Tomb: Estate Planning Consid-
erations of the New Procreation, 57 LA. L. Rav. 27, 30 (1996).
13 See E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm:
The Law of Post-Mortem Insemination, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 229, 230, 234 (1986-87)
(addressing the legal issues of post-mortem insemination).
14 See Mika & Hurst, supra note 6, at 996 (citing to E. Donald Shapiro, New
Innovations in Conception and Their Effects Upon Our Law and Morality, 31 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 37, 41 (1986)).
15 See Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 13, at 234 (discussing the legal issues
surrounding the rights and liabilities attaching to sperm ownership). See also Ellen J.
Garside, Posthumous Progeny: A Proposed Resolution to the Dilemma of the Post-
humously Conceived Child, 41 Loy. L. REv. 713, 717 (1996) (explaining the illigiti-
mate status of children conceived after death in the state of Louisiana, equating them
to children born outside of marriage).
16 See In re Adoption of Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, 435 (1973) (holding
that a child, conceived during marriage by consentual artificial insemination, is the
legitimate child of both parents, and thus it is necessary for a father, following a di-
vorce, to give consent for the child to be adopted).
17 See Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 13, at 234 (exploring the historical
development of artificial insemination).
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widows, if necessary.18 In 1949, it was discovered that the addition
of a small amount of glycerol before freezing would increase the
survival rate of the sperm. 19 It is now a common procedure for a
couple in which the man is infertile to go to a sperm bank to have
the woman artificially inseminated with the sperm of an anony-
mous donor. Sperm banks have evolved to allow for couples in
which the man is infertile to produce children. Sperm can be fro-
zen for up to ten years and therefore, a couple desiring to have a
child can go to a sperm bank any time to have sperm that had been
previously frozen by the husband or a donor, implanted into the
woman.
Furthermore, the freezing allows the donation and the receipt
of the sperm to occur at different times. Without this technique,
donors and recipients would have to be matched up at very specific
times, and the procedure would not be as convenient. Furthermore,
a lot of men donate their sperm because of the anonymity in-
volved. A matching program might possibly take away the ano-
nymity factor. Also, without the ability to freeze the sperm, it
would have to be donated at the same time the woman's body is
ovulating. This requirement may not be convenient for the sperm
donor and therefore, he may choose to forego the process. Frozen
sperm is currently used by both single women desiring to have a
child, and couples in which the man is infertile.20 Other reasons for
freezing sperm include an insurance against future infertility be-
cause of radiation or chemotherapy and the desire of unmarried
women to have children.21
Moreover, artificial insemination through the use of frozen
sperm has provided the first means of posthumous reproduction.
Women are now able to have a child using the sperm of a deceased
man. The fact that sperm can be frozen allows for the possibility of
implantation in the woman for up to ten years. Therefore, if a
man's sperm is removed and frozen and he subsequently dies, it is
still viable to fertilize an egg for approximately ten years. Without
the technique of freezing sperm, posthumous reproduction by a
man would only be possible for an extremely short period, imme-
diately following his death. However, since the sperm can be fro-
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 1035 (explaining the three main types of dis-
putes that arise with regard to the posthumous use of frozen sperm and providing
illustrative cases).
21 See Mika & Hurst, supra note 6, at 996 (providing an historical overview of
artificial insemination and the factors that have influenced its widespread accep-
tance).
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zen, a man can make a conscious choice to preserve the sperm for
his wife's use after his death.
Artificial insemination provides the pathway for women who
are unable to gestate a child, to have a baby with the assistance of
a surrogate mother. Surrogacy is another form of assisted repro-
duction. Technological advances now make it possible to separate
genetic contribution and gestation, two functions traditionally
thought to be bound together. Artificial insemination combined
with the use of a surrogate makes posthumous reproduction possi-
ble.
A woman who suffers from blocked or nonexistent fallopian
tubes (the largest cause of female infertility) or who suffers
from medical problems which make pregnancy extremely
dangerous or undesirable can become a mother simply by
contracting with another woman or surrogate mother to carry
and give birth to a child.
22
Surrogacy is either partial, in which the surrogate is artificially
inseminated with the sperm of the husband, or full, where the egg
and sperm of the couple desiring the baby are used.23 In full surro-
gacy, the surrogate is not the genetic mother of the child. Full sur-
rogacy is the method that must be used in posthumous reproduc-
tion. Surrogacy agreements are usually made through a contract,
and therefore governed by contract law. When these contracts are
breached by one side or the other, issues relating to who the
mother is, what the best interests of the child are, and whether it is
acceptable to contract for a baby, come about.24
Surrogacy is a necessary element of posthumous reproduction
by a woman. Currently there are no medical advances which allow
for gestation of a baby outside of a woman's body. Therefore,
without the ability to legally have a child with the assistance of a
surrogate, posthumous reproduction by a woman is impossible.
Some states have held that surrogacy arrangements are permissi-
ble, but prohibited paying consideration in conjunction with the
22 Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 13, at 235 (explaining how technology
has made artificial insemination increasingly available).
23 See Garside, supra note 15, at 716 (describing full and partial surrogacy in
detail). See also Christine A. Djalleta, A Twinkle in a Decedent's Eye: Proposed
Amendments to the Uniform Probate Code in Light of New Reproductive Technology,
67 TEMP. L. REV. 335, 338 (1994) (explaining the different methods of surrogacy in
more technical terms).
24 See generally Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Defining
Motherhood in the Era of Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 497
(1996) (discussing the ways in which differing types of surrogacy arrangements af-
fect the legal definition of motherhood).
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surrogate's services. 25 Further, due to the fear of children becom-
ing commodities, some states, such as Michigan, have held that
surrogacy arrangements involving a fee are completely null and
void. Moreover, a majority of the courts have decided any type of
surrogacy contracts are void and unenforceable.27 With the states
leaning towards making surrogacy extremely difficult, if not im-
possible, the options to infertile couples are decreasing. Despite
the medical advances that make posthumous reproduction by
women feasible, without surrogacy, it is impossible.
Along with surrogacy arrangements come multiple legal is-
sues, especially in the event of a breach by either party. Due to the
fact that surrogacy is a necessary element of posthumous repro-
duction by a woman, these legal issues must be considered when
determining whether posthumous reproduction by women should
be legally permitted. Part V of this Note discusses various interests
affected in reaching the conclusion that posthumous reproduction
by women should be legally prohibited.
Another method of assisted reproduction is in vitro fertiliza-
tion (IVF). Because posthumous reproduction involves the death
of the genetic mother, IVF is a necessary element of posthumous
reproduction by women. The theory behind posthumous reproduc-
tion is to have a child after the genetic mother has died, therefore
"traditional" conception is not possible. IVF is a widely used tech-
nique and involves the fertilization of the woman's eggs outside
the body. 28 IVF involves a doctor removing the ova from a woman,
adding sperm, and implanting any resulting pre-embryos into the
woman. Ova can be extracted from the woman through "a proce-
dure called a laparoscopy or through a needle aspiration guided by
an ultrasound."29 The eggs can be from the woman who will ges-
tate the embryos or from a donor, and the eggs can be mixed with
25 See Doe v. Kelley, 307 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding state
interference with contractual agreement for surrogacy was within constitutional limits
when contract provided financial compensation to surrogate mother). See also
Stephanie F. Schultz, Comment, Surrogacy Arrangements: Who Are The "Parents"
of a Child Born Through Artificial Reproductive Techniques?, 22 OHIo N.U. L. REV.
273, 288-92 (1995) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of surrogacy ar-
rangements and the enforcability of surrogacy contracts).
26 See Schultz, supra note 25, at 280-81 (outlining the reasons that Michigan's
Surrogate Parenting Act holds surrogacy contracts for compensation void and unen-
forceable).
27 See id. at 289-90 (describing the general enforceability of surrogacy con-
tracts).
28 See Garside, supra note 15, at 714 (explaining generally the process of artifi-
cial insemination). See also Schultz, supra note 25, at 274 (describing the technique
of in vitro fertilization).
29 Djalleta, supra note 23, at 337-38.
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sperm from the husband or a sperm donor. Further, the sperm can
be fresh or frozen.30 After approximately forty-eight hours, after
the embryos have developed into approximately eight cells, the
pre-embryos are ready to be injected into the woman's uterus
through the cervix, with the procedure taking two to three days.31
Given all of the possible genetic contributors, there are many pos-
sible combinations of contributors that can be involved in IVF.
Moreover, there are many circumstances under which IVF can be
used, with the most relevant being posthumous reproduction.
Another advancement in reproductive technology is frozen
embryos. When freezing embryos, it is not necessary for the same
woman to participate in both the gestation and the genetic repro-
duction of the child. The process involves uniting the egg and
sperm outside of the body and then freezing the pre-embryo.32
These pre-embryos can be frozen for anywhere between two and
six hundred years; and consequently a child can be born well after
one or both of its parents' deaths. 3 As of today, no children have
been born as a result of a dead mother leaving an egg behind.34
Currently the only case involving the use of frozen embryos is
the case of Julie Garber. Ms. Garber was diagnosed with cancer
and decided to have her eggs extracted, fertilized with an anony-
mous donor, and frozen for her future use.35 Ms. Garber subse-
quently died and her parents have found a surrogate to carry their
grandchild.36 However, recently, the last attempt to posthumously
conceive Ms. Garber's child failed when the surrogate miscarried
in December 1997.37 Therefore, currently there have been no chil-
dren conceived through successful posthumous reproduction by a
woman.
B. Current State of Law Relating to Reproductive Technologies
There are no statutes or cases to date which address posthu-
mous reproduction by women. A few courts have, however, ex-
" See id. at 338.
31 See Garside, supra note 15, at 714.
32 See Mika & Hurst, supra note 6, at 996 (explaining the technology enabling
pre-embryo creation and storage outside the body).
33 See id. (noting that cryopreserved sperm of ten years has still produced
healthy children).
34 See Collins, supra note 8, at El (noting that if Julie Garber's parents were
successful in having a surrogate carry Julie's biological child to birth, the child would
be the first child born from the egg of a deceased mother).
35 See id. (discussing the ethical issues surrounding modem reproductive tech-
nolo V as illustrated in the Garber situation).
See id. (raising many ethical questions and comparing critics' viewpoints).
7 See Weiss, supra note 11, at Al.
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amined the issue of posthumous reproduction by men. These cases
provide some indication of how courts might analyze a proposal
for posthumous reproduction by women.
Due to the fact that sperm can be frozen, it is not necessary
for a man to be alive at the time the sperm are implanted into a
woman. In fact, a lot of men have frozen their sperm expressly for
use after their deaths. The first case to deal with posthumous re-
production was a French case, Parpalaix v. CECOS.38 In this case,
Alain Parpalaix, after being diagnosed with testicular cancer and
realizing it could leave him sterile, deposited his sperm at a sperm
bank for use after his chemotherapy treatments were completed.39
However, he gave no indication to the sperm bank regarding what
should be done with the sperm in the event of his death. 40 After his
death, Mr. Parpalaix's wife wanted to retrieve the sperm but her
request was denied by the sperm bank, Centre d'Etude et de Con-
servation du Sperme (CECOS). 41 CECOS told Mrs. Parpalaix there
was no law which said they must return the sperm to her, and con-
sequently it belonged to them.42 The French court found there was
a fundamental right to procreate, and after unsuccessful appeals,
CECOS was ordered to return the vials of sperm to the wife of the
deceased.43 The court described the sperm as "the seed of life...
tied to the fundamental liberty of a human being to conceive or not
to conceive.'44 The wife of the deceased was unsuccessful in her
attempt to get pregnant, but Parpalaix is credited with bringing the
issues out in the open. This case, although not controlling and not
dealing with posthumous reproduction by women, is relevant to
the topic of this Note. Due to the fact that medicine is advancing
rapidly, posthumous reproduction by women is technically possi-
ble and, therefore, the issues that are involved must be confronted.
The holding of Parpalaix gives an indication of how the courts in
the United States might decide posthumous reproduction issues,
31 T.G.I. Creteil, Aug. 1, 1984, Gaz. Pal. 1984, 2, pan. jurispr., 560. See also
Mika & Hurst, supra note 6, at 1008-10 (explaining the case of Corrine Parpalaix,
who was not permitted to retrieve sperm her deceased husband stored before he un-
derwent chemotherapy).
39 See Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 13, at 229 (explaining the first judi-
cial pronouncement regarding post-mortem artificial insemination).
See id. at 229-30 (leaving no instructions led the court to decide the issue by
ascertaining the intent of the donor).
41 See id. at 230.
42 See id.
43 See id. at 233 (noting that the court considered property rights irrelevant to its
decision).
44 Id. at 232 (quoting GATrE DU PALAIS, Sept. 15, 1984, at 12) (stating that
sperm should not "be subjected to the rules of contracts").
[Vol. 9:203
POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION
including situations involving posthumous reproduction by
women.
The first case in the United States to deal with posthumous
reproduction by a man was Hecht v. Superior Court.45 In Hecht, a
California man left fifteen vials of his sperm in an account in a
California sperm bank prior to committing suicide. 46 Upon donat-
ing the sperm, Mr. Kane signed a "Specimen Storage Agreement,"
providing for storage of the sperm in accordance with the request
of the executor of his estate. The agreement also authorized the
release of the sperm to his long-time girlfriend, Deborah Hecht. 47
Furthermore, in his will, Mr. Kane bequeathed all right, title, and
interest that he had in the sperm to Ms. Hecht.48 Mr. Kane also in-
cluded a statement in his will stating that it was his intention to
have children with Ms. Hecht and, if and when she wanted to get
pregnant with his child, the sperm was waiting there for her.
49
After the death of Mr. Kane, Ms. Hecht attempted to retrieve
the sperm and was prohibited from doing so by Mr. Kane's exist-
ing adult children. The trial court issued an order to have the
sperm destroyed, but the court of appeals held Kane had a limited
property interest in the sperm, and could bequeath it by will:50 Mr.
Kane's will left Ms. Hecht twenty percent of all his property. The
probate court considered vials of sperm to be a part of Mr. Kane's
estate and therefore twenty percent of the vials were to be awarded
to Ms. Hecht. Since there were a total of fifteen vials, the court
ordered three vials, or- twenty percent of them, be given to Ms.
Hecht, in accordance with Mr. Kane's will. After an additional
three years of battling over the remaining sperm, a court of appeals
granted Ms. Hecht the right to the remaining twelve vials of Mr.
Kane's sperm.51 The appellate court based its decision on Mr.
Kane's clear indication of his intent to give the sperm to Ms.
Hecht to produce their child. Furthermore, the court concluded Ms.
Hecht should have all the sperm rather than a portion of it. "A
man's sperm or a woman's ova or a couple's embryos are not the
45 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal.Ct. App. 1993) (considering whether a man can
cryogenically deposit sperm at a sperm bank to be released to his girlfriend in the
event of his death, and concluding the trial court's order to destroy the sperm consti-
tuted an abuse of discretion).
'6 Id. at 275.
47 Id.
48 id.
49 Id.
'0 See generally Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 275 (holding also that no public policy
prohibits the artificial insemination of the girlfriend because of her status as an un-
married woman, and no policy prohibits conception by artificial insemination using
the sperm of a deceased man).Hecht v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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same as a quarter of land, a cache of cash, or a favorite limou-
sine, ''52 and should not be divided. Based on the decedent's clear
intent, together with the "uniqueness" of the sperm, the court con-
cluded the remaining vials of sperm were to be distributed to Ms.
Hecht.53
The sole case in the United States involving a posthumously
created child is Hart v. Chater.54 The legal issues in Hart are dif-
ferent from both Parpalaix and Hecht in that the means of con-
ceiving the child is a moot point. The child in the Hart case has
been conceived and the pertinent issues are post-birth concerns
such as inheritance rights and legal recognition of the child's bio-
logical father. In Hart, Mr. Hart was diagnosed with non-Hodgkins
lymphoma of the esophagus.55 Fearing the chemotherapy would
leave him sterile, Mr. Hart deposited sperm in a sperm bank for his
future use,56 while specifically asking that the sperm be frozen and
for his wife to receive all rights to the sperm for her use or dis-
posal.57 After unsuccessful cancer treatments, Mr. Hart died, leav-
ing his sperm with his wife as the sole donee.5 8 Three months after
his death, Mrs. Hart underwent successful artificial insemination
using her deceased husband's sperm. 59 After her daughter's birth,
Mrs. Hart sought survivor's benefits for herself and her daughter,
Judith.6° Originally Mrs. Hart was denied benefits for her daughter
by the Social Security Administration based on the fact that Judith
was not the "natural child" of Mr. Hart.6 1 Furthermore, since Judith
was not born within three hundred days of Mr. Hart's death, she
was not recognized as his legitimate daughter. 62 After going
through multiple affirmations and reversals, in March 1996, a set-
tlement was reached and the Social Security Administration
52 Id. at 226.
51 Id. at 227.
54 See Robert J. Kerekes, My Child. . .But Not My Heir: Technology, The Law,
and Post-Mortem Conception, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 213, 232 (1996) (de-
scribing the unique property and inheritance issues that may arise when children are
conceived posthumously and discussing Hart v. Chater).
55 Id. (discussing Mr. Hart's medical condition and treatment protocol).
56 Id.
57 See Lorio, supra note 12, at 46 (explaining the facts of Hart v. Shalala, No.94-
3944 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 1993) (original complaint of Nancy Hart)).
58 See Kerekes, supra note 54, at 232.
59 id.
6 id.
61 See Lorio, supra note 12, at 46. See also Garside, supra note 15, at 721 (de-
scribing the case of Judith Hart).
62 See Lorio, supra note 12, at 47.
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awarded payment of benefits to Judith. 63 Although the focus of this
case is on property and inheritance issues, and therefore beyond
the scope of this Note, it brings about the reality of posthumously
conceived children. When enacting statutes regarding inheritance
and property rights, states did not contemplate posthumously con-
ceived children. 64 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not com-
mented on, nor given guidance relating to how the rights of post-
humously conceived children should be treated. 65
Hart represents concerns that may arise in future cases in-
volving posthumous reproduction by women, in that the result is a
child born without a parent. It is very important that the interests
of the child are considered when legislating reproductive technol-
ogy. Arthur Caplan, director of the Center of Bioethics at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, recently stated, "If you are going to make
babies in new and novel ways, you have to be sure it's in the inter-
est of the baby."66 The Hart case furthers the argument relating to
the difficulty a legislature has in drafting laws regarding inheri-
tance rights when children are born after the deaths of their par-
ents. Are the laws supposed to allow for indefinite administration
of an estate in case some children are born ten years later? The
fundamental issues faced by the parties in the Hart case can be
applied to a case involving posthumous reproduction by a woman.
In addition to the interests of the children discussed below, the
Hart case raises numerous social and financial issues that must be
considered by legislatures when drafting laws regarding posthu-
mous reproduction.
Hart is the only court case that has addressed the legal rights
of an existing posthumously reproduced child. However, the court
in Hecht commented on this matter: "[w]e also emphasize another
set of issues we did not decide in this opinion. We do not have be-
fore us the many legal questions raised by the possible birth of a
child to Hecht through the use of Kane's sperm." 67 Furthermore, in
the Hecht case, the California Court of Appeals refused to com-
ment on what the results would be if a child was created posthu-
63 See Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent: A Dialogue on Postmortem
Conception, Parental Responsibility, and Inheritance, 33 Hous. L. REV. 967, 988, &
n.120 (1996) (citing a statement by Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner at the Social
Security Administration, explaining that the Administration decided to settle the Hart
case, thus granting Judith Hart benefits).
64 See id. at 992 (noting that the Louisiana statute applied in Hart.)
65 See generally Robertson, supra note 1, at 1039-45 (discussing the interests the
state might assert if "[flor public policy reasons a state could decide that semen
should not be subject to posthumous transfer or use").
66 Weiss, supra note 11, at A16.
67 Hecht v. Superior Ct., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 228 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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mously. "[I]t is also entirely speculative as to whether any child
born to Hecht using decedent's sperm will be a burden on soci-
ety." 68 The courts appear reluctant to comment on these reproduc-
tive issues not yet confronted by legislatures. Society can not al-
low children to be brought into the world because of selfish adults.
Although many critics believe reproduction is a private decision,
the welfare of the children must also be considered. It is not fair to
bring a child into the world without a mother. It is time the states
got involved because, judging from Parpalaix, Hecht, and Hart,
the courts are likely to allow posthumous reproduction in the ab-
sence of laws explicitly banning it.
ifi. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION
Posthumous reproduction occurs when a child is born after the
death of one, or both, of his or her parents. Posthumous reproduc-
tion by men is technically simpler and more common than posthu-
mous reproduction by women, yet it is now also possible for a
child to be produced after his or her genetic mother has died. Post-
humous reproduction by a woman requires the use of a surrogate,
however, and surrogacy complicates the process for two reasons.
The first is the complex state of the law governing surrogacy con-
tracts. The second is that surrogacy involves the entry of a third
person into the arrangement. Therefore, issues confronted by par-
ties to a surrogacy agreement are also involved in posthumous re-
production by women.
A. Arguments in Favor of Permitting Posthumous Reproduction
Almost every individual desires to have children at some
point in his or her life and through those children, wants his or her
family to continue into the future. "Reproduction connects indi-
viduals with future generations and provides personal experiences
of great moments in large part because persons reproducing see
and have contact with offspring, or are at least aware that they ex-
ist." 69 People who have lost a wife or a girlfriend have the same
desire and it can be argued they should not lose this opportunity
because of an unexpected death. Some writers argue that posthu-
mous reproduction is a legacy of a loved one and the only chance
to have a child with the deceased.70 As the attorney for Mrs. Par-
(8 Hecht v. Superior Ct., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
69 Robertson, supra note I, at 1031.
70 See Carla Hall, A Legacy of Litigation: Can Sperm Be Bequeathed?, LA.
TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1994, at El (interviewing the surviving lover of an eccentric man
who made sperm bank deposits before committing suicide).
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palaix urged, "Let her give life to this child, the fruit of a love that
she goes on expressing with quiet determination. It is her most sa-
cred right." 7' Furthermore, it is argued that the desire to have a
child with the woman you love does not die with that person. The
man left behind still wants a child produced out of the love he
shared with his wife.
Another argument for allowing posthumous reproduction by
women is that it is not for the courts or legislatures to decide what
people are allowed to make decisions about, especially when it
comes to private decisions about procreation. The judge in the trial
court of the Hecht case concluded there was no "authority estab-
lishing the propriety of this court, or any court, to make the value
judgment as to whether it is better for such a potential child not to
be born assuming that both . . . providers wish to conceive the
child." 72 Moreover, in his dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick,73 Justice
Blackmun stated that a necessary part of giving individuals the
freedom to choose is accepting that people will make different
choices. 74 Further, "depriving individuals of the right to choose for
themselves how to conduct their intimate relationships poses a far
greater threat to the values most deeply rooted in our Nation's
history than tolerance of nonconformity could ever do." 75 Simply
because it is not the norm, does not mean something should be
prohibited. It can be argued that a woman has a right to make re-
productive decisions without the intrusion of the courts. Repro-
ductive choices are extremely private and it is arguable that a cou-
ple should be able to make those decisions on their own. Further-
more, the decision to have a child, whether before or after a per-
son's death, is included in the zone of privacy.
B. Arguments Against Permitting Posthumous Reproduction by
Women
However, there are multiple valid arguments against posthu-
mous reproduction by women. First, only a few features of what is
71 Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 13, at 231 (quoting Woman Must Wait To
Know If She Can Have Dead Husband's Baby, Reuters N. Eur. Serv., June 28, 1984,
at 7).a7 Henry Weinstein, Court Rules Sperm Can Be Bequeathed, L.A. TIMES, June
19, 1993, at BI (quoting Hecht v. Kane, 16 Cal. App. 4t 836, 858 (Cal.App. 2d
1993) (reporting on a California Court of Appeals ruling which allowed a man to
bequeath his frozen sperm via his will).
' 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding the constitutionality of Georgia's statute
prohibiting sodomy).
74 See id. at 205-06 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (arguing that Georgia's sodomy
statute should be ruled unconstitutional).
7' Id. at214.
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valued about reproductive experiences remain when the reproduc-
tion is posthumous.76 A large part of the decision to have a child
involves the desire to rear and gestate a child. In the case of post-
humous reproduction, a woman will be neither gestating nor rear-
ing the child. Furthermore, at most, the woman will have a present
satisfaction of what might occur in the future, after her death.77
There are also property arguments for banning posthumous
reproduction.78 Property rights are not limited to objects, and are
"commonly said to signify 'a bundle of legal rights' that includes
rights of possession, use, control and disposition." 79 Whether re-
productive materials, including frozen embryos, fall under the
category of property rights, is a subject of much debate.
Due to the fact that a person can decide while alive to donate
his or her organs, that may imply a person's interest in his or her
body could be considered one of "property." 8° However, with re-
spect to posthumous reproduction, we are dealing with a part of
the body that has the potential to create human life. The court in
Davis v. Davis8l refused to consider the embryos at issue to be
property. Embryos "are not, strictly speaking, either 'persons' or
'property,' but occupy an interim category that entitles them to
special respect because of their potential for human life."2
In accordance with the view that embryos are property is the
theory that embryos are merely the tissue of two people and those
people have sole discretion regarding the disposition of those em-
bryos. If the reproductive material is deemed property, and if the
person who dies leaves specific instructions regarding what he or
76 See Lorio, supra note 12, at 44 (quoting Robertson, supra note 1, at 1031-32).
See also Robertson, supra note 1, at 1030-32 (arguing that the essential reproductive
interest is less in posthumous reproduction than it is for living people).
77 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 1030-31 (weighing the benefits a woman
might receive through posthumous reproduction, against the costs of reproducing
without one or both of the biological parents).
78 See, e.g., Kerekes, supra note 54 (noting that it is not clear whether reproduc-
tive materials can be treated as property); Bonnie Steinbock, Sperm As Property, 6
STAN. L. & POL'y REv. 57 (1995) (discussing whether extracorporeal gametes are
property, and to whom they belong); Djalleta, supra note 23 (discussing the property
issues faced by the Uniform Probate Code due to this new technology); Brown, supra
note 4 (discussing the lack of legal analysis on the issue of human reproductive prop-
erty rights).
79 Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous
Procreation, 75 N.C.L. REV. 901, 913-14 (1997) (discussing the conflicts that may
arise when individuals cryopreserve gametes or embryos, and subsequently die).
80 See id. at 915 (discussing the concept of "property" as it relates to the human
body).
8" 842 S.W.2d 588, 596 (Tenn. 1992) (granting custody of pre-embryos to hus-
band in divorce).
82 Id. at 597.
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she wants done with it, it can be argued those wishes should be
followed based on the property rights. For example, in Hecht, Mr.
Kane left a will explicitly stating his desires relating to the dispo-
sition of his sperm after his death. The will provided, "I bequeath
all right, title, and interest that I may have in any specimens of my
sperm stored with any sperm bank or similar facility for storage to
Deborah Ellen Hecht." 83 Furthermore, Mr. Kane wrote a letter to
his potential future children speaking of his desire that they be
born to Ms. Hecht, and telling them that he loved them in his
dreams. 84 But the issue remains whether frozen sperm can be con-
sidered property. Embryos can not be likened to jewelry or a
house. As Professor Caplan noted, "[w]e ought not treat what are
basically the blueprints of potential human beings as property on a
par with a beachfront home or a beer can.''85 Considering embryos
property devalues human life. "Parents have the right to control
virtually every aspect of their children's lives, from the medical
care they receive to where they will live to the kind of education
they will get. Yet Xarents do not own their children, and children
are not property." Embryos are not property because they have
the potential to create human life. Furthermore, property is tradi-
tionally thought of as something that can be bought and sold in the
marketplace. Many people have a difficult time viewing reproduc-
tive materials as something that can be bought or sold." According
to Stephen Munzer 8 9 property should be defined as a bundle of
rights "with no single interest being indispensable to the defini-
tion." 89 Munzer does not extend ownership and hence, property
rights, to human bodies. 90 "Restrictions on transfer and the absence
of a liberty to consume or destroy, for example, indicate that per-
sons do not own their bodies in the way that they own automobiles
or desks."9' Therefore, embryos should not be considered property
83 Hecht v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275,276 (Cal. CL App. 1993).
84 See Steinbock, supra note 78, at 59 (discussing Mr. Kane's letter to his future
offspring).
85 Weinstein, supra note 72, at B I (arguing that a property framework is not
necessarily appropriate for this sensitive topic).
86 Steinbock, supra note 78, at 60.
87 Seeid.at6l.
88 See id. at 66 n. 42 (Munzer is a legal scholar who uses the "bundle" metaphor
relating to property rights). See also STEPHEN MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 56
(1990) (evaluating whether the concept of "property" can be justified by arguing that
"property-talk" does not demean individuals by undercutting their autonomy and
"property-talk" does not depict people as things or commodities).
9 Id. at61.
90 See id.
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and if a woman dies before using the embryos, they should not be
treated as the property of the woman.
Second, the state has an interest in preventing the exploitation
of children. It is possible that some'people may want to have a
child merely for the dramatic effect of it.2 Moreover, the child is
being intentionally brought into the world without its mother.93 It
is extremely important that the reasons for bringing the child into
the world are explored. It is imperative to be certain that these
children are not being conceived merely as a replacement for the
deceased. If that is the case, the child could end up neglected or
even resented.
Furthermore, posthumous reproduction, whether by women or
men, may create confusion about heritage. "Time-honored re-
straints implicitly teach that clarity about who your parents are,
clarity in lines of generation, clarity about who is whose, are the
indispensable foundations of a sound family life, itself the sound
foundation of civilized community., 94 Posthumous reproduction
will blur the concepts of generations and identity for the posthu-
mously created children.9'-Furthermore, it is crucial for a child's
identity and self-perception that his or her origins are clear. Also,
society does not want to overlook the right of a child to connect
with forbearers. 96 It seems selfish for a couple of adults to take this
right away from a child in a situation in which the child has no say
in the matter.
Moreover, many people view posthumous reproduction as un-
natural. The property of the decisional right to procreate should be
taken away from a person after he or she dies. That right, "al-
though biotechnologically feasible and an acceptable extension of
estate planning and property rights, is simply wrong." 97 Barry
91 MUNZER, supra note 88, at 43. See also Brown, supra note 4, at 73 (noting
that little attention has been given by courts to "reconciling the effects of human re-
productive advances with individual common law proprietary rights").
92 See Hall, supra note 70, at El (describing Hecht's response to the accusation
that she merely wants to have her eccentric, dead lover's child for dramatic effect).
93 See Collins, supra note 8, at El (relating critics' arguments that it is wrong to
purposely produce a parentless child).
94 Chester, supra note 63, at 971 (quoting William J. Wagner, The Contactual
Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural Endoisment
Critique, 41 CAsE W. RFs. L. Rav. 1, 151 n. 665 (1990) (emphasizing the importance
of self-identity to self-respect)).
95 See Chester, supra note 63, at 971-72 (addressing the need for the law of wills
and estates to remedy the inherent problems with contractual exchanges between
generations).
96 See id. at 994 (citing Elizabeth Bartholet, Family Bonds: Adoption & the
Politics of Parenting 229 (1993)).
97 Brown, supra note 4, at 80.
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Brown, a professor of property, professional responsibility, and
bio-medicine at Suffolk University Law School states,
"[s]anctioning reproduction without biological parents may be
considered socially disjunctive regardless of the resources avail-
able to the cryogenic orphans."
98
Last, there are financial and inheritance reasons for disallow-
ing posthumous reproduction. If a posthumously created child can
claim a right to his or her deceased parent's estate, the administra-
tion of the estate could be delayed indefinitely. A state has an in-
terest in administration of estates, stable land titles, and orderly
distribution of property after death. 99 To allow posthumous repro-
duction would mean that estates could potentially be left open in-
definitely. Based on the fact the root of reproductive rights is not
present in posthumous reproduction, together with financial issues
and the desire to prevent exploitation of children, this kind of re-
production should be banned by state law.
Property and surrogacy issues together with the interests of
children demonstrate the vast array of reasons posthumous repro-
duction by women should be banned. The fact that posthumous
reproduction allows some people the opportunity to have children
who otherwise would not have been afforded that opportunity, is
not enough to overcome the negative implications. Being born to
only one parent is not the optimum situation for a child and the
legal community should do everything to prevent it from happen-
ing.
IV. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION
Before determining whether it is possible for a state to suc-
cessfully draft a statute banning posthumous reproduction that
would not be declared unconstitutional, it is necessary to explore
what the Supreme Court has deemed to be a fundamental right. If
the Supreme Court declares a right to be fundamental, the state
may only regulate it if it has a compelling interest, and if there are
no other possible means of achieving that end. The Supreme Court
has established a bundle of rights which make up a zone of privacy
which is considered fundamental. A strict scrutiny test is applied
to cases involving fundamental rights. Therefore, when a state at-
tempts to regulate conduct involving a fundamental right, the Su-
preme Court applies a strict scrutiny test to determine the consti-
98 Id.
99 See, e.g., Mika & Hurst, supra note 6, at 1018 (arguing that the state has an
incentive to proactively pass legislation limiting the possibility for post-mortem chil-
dren to indefinitely delay the administration of the decedent's estate).
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tutionality of the law. The Court, in Carey v. Population Services
Internationall°° found, quoting Roe v. Wade, that a regulation may
be "justified only by a 'compelling state interest' . . . and.., must
be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at
stake."' 0' The right to procreate has been included in the "right of
privacy" declared fundamental by the Supreme Court. The Court
has not explicitly described what it would consider a compelling
state interest, but as of today, the Court has not held any state in-
terest sufficiently compelling to uphold a restriction on the right to
procreate. In considering a ban on posthumous reproduction by
women, it is necessary to determine whether posthumous repro-
duction would be considered a fundamental right, and if so,
whether a state has a compelling interest in banning it.
A. Procreation
Although the Supreme Court has held procreation to be a fun-
damental right under the Constitution, it is not clear whether post-
humous reproduction is included within the framework of that
fundamental right. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,"°2 the Supreme Court
held that "[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the [human] race."'1 3 Skinner involved an
Oklahoma statute which declared that if a person met the statutory
definition of an habitual criminal, a judge or jury could authorize
sterilization of that person. 1°4 The Oklahoma statute defined an
habitual criminal as
[A] person who, having been convicted two or more times for
crimes 'amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude' ei-
ther in an Oklahoma court or in a court of any other state, is
thereafter convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and is
sentenced to a term of imprisonment in an Oklahoma penal
institution. 105
'0o 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (declaring a New York statute unconstitutional in its
entirety, insofar as it applied to nonprescription contraceptives).
1o1 Id. at 688 (discussing the inability of state interests to override the constitu-
tionally protected right of decision in child-bearing matters).
102 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
o Id. at 541.
'o4 Id. at 535. See also Mika & Hurst, supra note 6, at 1002 (summarizing the
case of Skinner v. Oklahoma).
105 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
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The Supreme Court found the Oklahoma statute violated a per-
son's constitutional right to procreate. 1°6 "We are dealing here with
legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.
'' 07
In later decisions, the Supreme Court cited Skinner as the ba-
sis for striking down state laws which interfered with an individ-
ual's right to procreate. For example, in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut,108 the Court recognized a right of privacy for married indi-
viduals, specifically regarding their right to use contraceptives. 1
9
The Court recognized the existence of a zone of privacy sur-
rounding individuals, and thereby invalidated a Connecticut statute
which prohibited the use of any drug or device to prevent concep-
tion." 0 "[T]he present case, then, concerns a relationship lying
within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental consti-
tutional guarantees.""' Griswold exemplified the Court's belief
that the Constitution protects an individual's privacy decisions
from intrusion by the states."
12
The Supreme Court extended the right of privacy to unmarried
individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird."13 "If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fun-
damentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child."'" 4 Eisenstadt involved a Massachusetts law forbid-
ding the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons.1 5 The
Court concluded the state interest of deterring premarital sex was
not compelling, and therefore could not impede the fundamental
right to make decisions about procreation.
Further, in Carey,"16 the Court recognized the individual's
right to make procreative decisions as fundamental." 7 The statute
'(6 Id. at 541. See also Schultz, supra note 25, at 276 (providing a constitutional
analysis of the right to procreate).
'0 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
'og 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut law forbidding the use of
contraceptive devices unconstitutionally intruded upon the right of marital privacy).
1o9 Id.
1o See Schultz, supra note 25, at 277 (stating that the decision to bear children is
a fundamental privacy right protected by the Constitution, as announced in Griswold
v. Connecticut).
"'. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
112 See Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 13, at 244 (quoting G. GUNTHER,
CONSTITU fIONAL LAW 515 (1985) (recognizing the right to "bear or beget a child
based on the fundamental right of privacy")).
"' 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that a Massachusetts statute that granted mar-
ried persons, but not single persons, the right to obtain contraceptives, violated the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
"4 Id. at453.
15 Id. at 441 (discussing MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 272, § 21 (1990)).
1l6 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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challenged in Carey forbade the distribution of contraceptives to
people under the age of sixteen, and prohibited the distribution to
anyone over the age of sixteen, except by licensed pharmacists."
8
Essentially the Court held that if a person has a right to decide
whether to bear or beget a child, as stated in Eisenstadt, then he or
she has a right to decide whether to use contraceptives, thereby
determining whether he or she will have children. Following this
line of cases, according to the Supreme Court, there exists a fun-
damental right under the Constitution to make decisions relating to
procreation, and this right extends to all individuals, whether mar-
ried or single. Therefore, it could be argued that posthumous re-
production by a woman is included within this fundamental right
to procreate. However, the issue must be further explored to de-
termine whether reproduction by artificial means is protected, and
then whether posthumous reproduction is protected as a funda-
mental right.
B. Procreation by Artificial Means
The Supreme Court decisions have not addressed whether the
fundamental right to make decisions relating to procreation in-
cludes procreation by artificial means."' 9 Although the fundamen-
tal right to reproduce has been explicitly established by the Court,
which means or methods are permissible has not been decided.' 20 It
can be inferred by the Court's holding in Carey that since the abil-
ity to choose the means by which to have or not have children is
included as a part of the fundamental right, artificial means of re-
production would also be included in that right. Methods of as-
sisted reproduction are considered a means of reproduction and
therefore, should be included in the fundamental right to procreate.
The fact that a couple needs assistance when reproducing does not
lessen their fundamental right in any way.
Although the Supreme Court has not commented on this issue,
at least one district court has held reproductive assistance to be
included under the umbrella of the fundamental right to procre-
117 Id. at 685 (discussing the importance of the right to be free from government
intrusions into matters as intimate as human relationships).
118 Id. at 681.
119 See Mika & Hurst, supra note 6, at 1001-07 (discussing cases in which the
Supreme Court resisted determining that procreation by artificial means is a funda-
mental right, but noting that one federal court and three state courts have dealt with
this issue).
120 See Schultz, supra note 25, at 277 (commenting that although reproduction
has been defined as a fundamental privacy right, the acceptable means and methods
of reproduction have not yet been defined).
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ate.121 In Lifchez v. Hartigan, the U.S. District Court held an Illi-
nois statute was unconstitutional because it restricted a woman's
fundamental right to privacy, and "in particular, her right to make
reproductive choices free of government interference with those
choices."' 22 The Illinois statute at issue prohibited testing of and
experimentation with fetuses. However, the court declared these
practices fall within a woman's zone of privacy. 123 "It takes no
great leap of logic to see that within the cluster of constitutionally
protected choices that includes the right to have access to contra-
ceptives, there must be included within that cluster the right to
submit to a medical procedure that may bring about, rather than
prevent, pregnancy."' 4
A California court has also extended the fundamental right to
procreate to include assisted reproduction in both Johnson v. Cal-
vert1 25 and Hecht. Johnson involved a surrogacy contract and the
court held it was not the role of the court to inhibit the use of re-
productive technologies if the legislature had not yet chosen to do
so. Furthermore, any effort to do so would inhibit "the fundamen-
tal nature of the rights of procreation and privacy.'
' 26
Further, the Tennessee Supreme Court also extended the fun-
damental right to procreate to include technologically assisted
means of reproduction. Davis involved the question of who de-
cides what to do with frozen embryos.' 27 Mr. and Mrs. Davis used
medically assisted methods of reproduction in attempts to get
pregnant, and in the process had frozen some of their embryos for
future use. 28 The Davis' later filed for divorce, and this case in-
volved their dispute over what to do with the embryos.' 29 Mrs.
Davis decided she wanted the embryos donated to a childless cou-
ple, and Mr. Davis wanted them destroyed.130 The court held the
state's interest was not sufficient to infringe on the procreative
autonomy of the embryo providers. 13' Therefore, it can be inferred
the Tennessee court held the fundamental right to procreate in-
121 See Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. 1111990).
'22 Id. at 1376.
123 Id. (noting that "[e]mbryo transfer is a procedure designed to enable an infer-
tile woman to bear her own child").
124 Id. at 1377.
'2 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (deciding the issue of parental rights to a child re-
lated genetically to the Calverts, but gestated by a surrogate, Johnson, in favor of the
Calvert couple).
126 Id. at 787.
127 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
121 Id. at 591-92.
129 id.
*0 Id. at 590.
' ' Id. at 602.
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cludes procreative choices involving noncoital (non-intercourse)
reproduction.
Furthermore, some commentators argue that Carey can be
extended to assisted reproduction, and that procreation is procrea-
tion no matter what the method. For example, bioethicist John
Robertson believes natural reproduction has been valued and "it
should be equally honored when reproduction requires technologi-
cal assistance. ', 132 According to Robertson, what matters is the
shared wish of both people to "replicate themselves, transmit
genes, gestate, and rear children biologically related to them."' 33
The Supreme Court has not specifically looked at the issue of re-
production by artificial means as a fundamental right, 134 but Rob-
ertson argues that the interests the Court is attempting to protect
through privacy are the same whether the child is conceived natu-
rally or with assistance. 135 "[T]he desire of infertile couples 'to
have a family - to beget, bear, and rear offspring - is as strong as
in fertile couples." ' 136 Therefore, Robertson believes it is likely the
Court would extend the fundamental right to procreate to situations
involving assisted reproduction.
According to Robertson, the interests of would-be parents in
procreative choice are valuable and worthy of great respect when
considering the use of reproductive technologies. 137 The reasons
and the goals of infertile couples are the same as fertile couples
and therefore, they should be accorded the same protection under
the Constitution. If the Court recognizes that the fundamental right
to procreate extends to situations involving assisted reproduction,
132 JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEw RE-
PRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 4 (1994) (exploring technological and bioethical issues
surrounding reproduction). See also Anne MacLean Massie, Regulating Choice: A
Constitutional Law Response to Professor John A. Robertson's Children of Choice,
52 WASH & LEE L. REV. 135 (1995) (describing Professor Robinson's position that
procreative liberty should prevail whether or not reproductive technology questions
are involved).
13 ROBERTSON, supra note 132, at 32 (arguing that the moral right of coital re-
production extends to noncoital reproduction).
134 See Gary N. Skoloff, Introduction to Special Issues on Surrogacy, 22 FAM.
L.Q. 119 (1988) (discussing the Model Surrogacy Act and how it recognizes and
deals with the competing conditional rights of the participants to the surrogacy ar-
ranjement).
See Schultz, supra note 25, at 277-78 (arguing that family relationships, child
birth, and child rearing are involved no matter how the child is conceived).
136 Massie, supra note 132, at 147 (quoting ROBERTSON, supra note 132, at 39).
See also Schultz, supra note 25 (arguing that the right to procreate should extend to
surrogate births because the underlying values and interests the court is trying to-
protect are the same with both natural and artificial conception).
137 See ROBERTSON, supra note 132, at 220-22 (arguing that reproductive tech-
nologies should be assessed from a standpoint of procreative liberty).
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any restrictions on that right will be strictly scrutinized. Therefore,
the restriction will be permitted only if it is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest and there are no other means available to
achieve that state interest.
1 38
It can be implied from the above-mentioned line of cases that
the fundamental right to procreate encompasses all means and
methods of reproduction. If the Court's purpose in proclaiming
reproduction a fundamental right was to protect the privacy of
marriage and family decisions, it is logical this right would also
include assisted reproductive methods. A person does not have any
less of a right to make procreative decisions because he or she is
infertile. The same reasons exist for protecting the right to procre-
ate in people who need assistance, as with those who do not. If the
Court does not extend this right to include reproductive technolo-
gies, then the Court would be depriving infertile couples of the
right to procreate, which has been declared fundamental.
C. Posthumous Reproduction
However, a much more complicated issue arises when deter-
mining whether this fundamental right to procreate extends to
posthumous reproduction. The difficulty with this issue lies in the
fact that the rights of two individuals are at stake. If a woman dies,
her fundamental right to procreate may terminate, but her hus-
band's does not. Therefore, it must be determined whose funda-
mental right we are concerned with and how far that right extends.
The fundamental right to procreate should not continue after
death. There have been no Supreme Court cases explicitly stating
whether fundamental rights extend after death, but it does not seem
likely that the Court would extend such a right. There is at least
one state case in which the court held a woman's right of privacy
was extinguished upon her death. In University Health Services v.
Piazzi,139 a pregnant woman was declared brain dead, but the Su-
perior Court of Richmond County, Georgia ordered life support
was to be maintained, despite opposition by the woman's hus-
band.' 4° Looking at the reasons why the Supreme Court held pro-
creative liberty to be a fundamental right, those same interests are
not at issue in cases of posthumous reproduction by a woman.
138 See Andrews, supra note 5, at 794 (discussing the legal standard that would
be required to uphold restrictions on the use of reproductive technologies if courts
reconize a fundamental right of couples to use such technologies).
1.9 See Note, Incubating for the State: The Precarious Autonomy of Persistently
Vegetative Brain-Dead Pregnant Women, 22 GA. L. REv. 1103, 1108-11 (1988) (dis-
cussing University Health Services, Inc. v. Piazzi, No. CV 86-RCCV-464 (Super. Ct.
of Richmond County, Ga., Aug. 4, 1986)).
'4o Id. at 1110-11 (footnote omitted).
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Much of the decision to protect the right to reproduce rests on
its relation to bodily integrity and marital intimacy. In Carey, the
Court stated, "it is clear that among the decisions that an individ-
ual may make without unjustified government interference are per-
sonal decisions 'relating to marriage .... ," 41 Further, in Eisen-
stadt, the Court cited Olmstead v. U.S.,142 "[tihe makers of our
Constitution... sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions, and their sensations. They conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be let alone... ,143 However,
the desire to be free from bodily intrusion is not at issue when the
woman has died. Further, Robertson concludes, "[e]ven if the
Court found that noncoital reproduction was protected, decisions
about posthumous reproduction are so far removed from those in-
terests that it is highly unlikely that a fundamental constitutional
right would be found."'44
Moreover, the Court in both Carey and Griswold found the
fundamental right to procreate evolved from a right to privacy.
Specifically, the Court held the state did not have a right to invade
a person's body and tell her what to do or not to do with it. It is
difficult to argue that a person who has died has the same privacy
rights.
Also, when a woman is dead, she will not have the opportu-
nity to gestate and rear a child, another important reason behind
protecting the right to reproduce. Posthumous reproduction is very
different from reproduction while living. As Robertson argues, "A
person who chooses to reproduce chooses to accept the experi-
ences and responsibilities entailed in reproduction and child rear-
ing, unknown and vague as they may be at the time of choice.''45
The choice to raise a child is not there when a person is dead. "The
individual will not gestate. She will not rear. While alive, she will
not even know she has reproduced genetically."' 46 However, Rob-
ertson argues, "the meaning or value of posthumous reproduction
lies in the importance that individuals place on being able to de-
141 Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977)
(quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that state miscegenation
statutes violate equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment)).
142 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (explaining the broad scope of protection sought by
the makers of the Constitution), overruled by Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
143 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 n. 10 (1972) (holding that a Massachu-
setts statute which only permitted married persons the right to obtain contraceptives
violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution).
144 Robertson, supra note 1, at 1041-42.
145 John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L.
Rav. 421, 427 (1996).
14 Lorio, supra note 12, at 44 (quoting Robertson, supra note 1, at 103 1).
[Vol. 9:203
POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION
termine the fate of their gametes, embryos, and fetuses after they
have died."147 A present satisfaction of a possibility of children
after one's death is not sufficient to uphold the argument of exten-
sion of a fundamental right. The Court is clear regarding why it
has deemed procreation a fundamental right. When those reasons
are applied to posthumous reproduction, they are not sufficient
enough to uphold a fundamental right, when compared to the
harms caused.' 48
The second aspect .of the fundamental right to posthumously
procreate involves the significance that should be assigned to the
right of the father to procreate. The father is still alive, and it can
be argued that his right to procreate is equal to that of any other
living person. Therefore, he has a fundamental right to reproduce.
But does that right extend to include the idea he has a right to re-
produce with someone who has died? The only case to date that
explicitly deals with this issue is Parpalaix. In Parpalaix, the court
"found in the fundamental right to procreate, the basis for the first
judicial or legislative pronouncement on post-mortem artificial
insemination."' 49 Moreover, if the courts declare frozen embryos to
be property, 50 the father will have control of the embryos. But as
stated earlier in this Note, posthumous reproduction by women
requires the use of a surrogate. Therefore, a man would have to
obtain the eggs on a property basis and legally hire a surrogate to
carry his child. Furthermore, by making posthumous reproduction
by women illegal, a man's fundamental right to procreate has not
been completely inhibited. The man will continue to have a right
to reproduce by many other means and methods. The state's inter-
est in protecting these children and preventing posthumous repro-
duction is stronger than an interest a man may have in creating a
child with a deceased woman. It is doubtful the Supreme Court
would consider the Parpalaix argument a valid argument for up-
holding posthumous reproduction as a fundamental right. There
are too many negatives to combat to allow for posthumous repro-
duction by women.
147 Robertson, supra note 1, at 1031 (discussing how the principle of autonomy
does not answer certain normative questions about the premortem importance to liv-
ing people of knowing that they can reproduce posthumously).
48 See discussion infra Part V.
149 Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 13, at 233 (discussing the court's holding
that the sperm of Mrs. Parpalaix's deceased husband should be returned to her for
artificial insemination).
15o See supra text accompanying notes 78-91.
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V. POLICY REASONS FOR PROHIBITING
POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION BY WOMEN
The state's interest in the child's psychological and financial
well-being plus the state's interest in its revenues, support a ban on
posthumous reproduction.151 The various state interests must be
weighed against an individual's interest in reproducing after death.
Assuming posthumous reproduction is not a fundamental right, the
state's interest must be important or legitimate and therefore, a
state ban should withstand constitutional challenge.
The first argument against posthumous reproduction by
women is the state's interest in protecting the welfare of the re-
sulting children. Public policy recommends children having two
parents whenever possible, therefore the state has an interest in
minimizing the number of children brought into the world with
only one parent. Starting life with only one parent may be detri-
mental to a child. "The Court's order [in Parpalaix] is a victory for
the widow and even for the father who can sire a child from the
grave, but it may be detrimental to the child."'' 52 Furthermore, re-
search indicates children of single parents are disadvantaged.' 53
Moreover, studies of children reared without mothers suggest
some disadvantages to the children. "Children of mother-only
families are more likely to be poor, more likely to have difficulty
in school and to drop out of high school, and [are] more likely to
commit delinquent acts and to engage in drug and alcohol use than
offspring from two-parent families.', 154 It can be argued that a lot
of children are raised by single parents and end up fine, however,
posthumously conceived children are different. Single parents of-
ten have the other parent available to play a role in the child's up-
bringing, both emotionally and financially. But in the case of a
posthumously created child, there is one bereaved parent bringing
a child into the world without the option of assistance from the
other parent. 55 Family law is principally based on an arrangement
that favors a nuclear family unit as being in the best interest of the
151 See Schiff, supra note 79, at 904 (discussing legal and social issues raised by
posthumous reproduction).
152 Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 13, at 246-47 (arguing that the Parpalaix
court failed to consider the best interests of the child).
153 See Steinbock, supra note 78, at 62 (citing Sara McLanahan & Karen Booth,
Mother-Only Families: Problems, Prospects, and Politics, 51 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
557 (1989)).
154 Steinbock, supra note 78, at 62.
155 See Kathleen Murray, Posthumous Conception is Ethical Trap, STAR TRIB.,
Aug. 1, 1995, at 3E (noting that there is a difference between single parenting and
posthumous conception).
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child. 56 The Parpalaix court has been criticized for not consider-
ing the best interests of the child.
15 7
Additionally, a state must be concerned with the psychologi-
cal welfare of a child who learns he or she was born after the death
of his or her mother, or that his or her mother committed sui-
cide. 5 8 There are also going to be concerns about the psychologi-
cal welfare of a child who learns he or she was paid for. The state
has the need to prevent children from being treated as commodi-
ties159 Commercialization of children is not a good idea and is es-
pecialVy prevalent in surrogacy contracts when consideration is
paid." It is impossible to have posthumous reproduction by
women without the assistance of a surrogate and therefore, the
possibility of commercializing children is prevalent. A Michigan
state court has found this interest to be compelling because babies
simply can not be bought.16' In many cases, surrogacy is based on
money, rather than the child, and that is one of the reasons some
states have declared surrogacy contracts null and void.
Last, it is in the best interests of a child for a state to prevent
potential custody disputes. Surrogacy contracts can result in dis-
putes as a result of a breach by either party. Often a woman
changes her mind after carrying the baby for so long, or the father
might decide he no longer wants the child for whatever reason. It
is important public policy for the state to prevent custody disputes
whenever possible. 12
One opposing argument, as Robertson concludes, is that the
only other option is death, so being born as a result of posthumous
reproduction is better than not being born at all.' 63 "Surely being
born to a single parent or when one or both progenitors are dead
does not make a child's life so painful or stressful that being born
156 See Anne Reichman Schiff, Frustrated Intentions and Binding Biology:
Seeking Aid in the Law, 44 DuKE L.J. 524,556 (1994).
157 See Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 13, at 246-47 (discussing criticism of
the Parpalaix decision by doctors and lawyers).
158 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 1033 (discussing various dilemmas that can
arise from posthumous reproduction, including the welfare of the offspring).
159 See Schultz, supra note 25, at 281 (enumerating the various state interests in
regulating surrogate births, including the state interest in not treating children as
commodities).
160 See id. (arguing that there are many legitimate state interests for regulating
surrogacy contracts for pay).
,
6
'See id. at 280-81 (stating that there is a compelling state interest in regulating
surrogate contracts for compensation).
16 See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (involving a custody battle over
a child produced as a result of a surrogacy agreement).
163 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 1040-41 (discussing the various state interests
for allowing the posthumous use of semen).
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amounts to wrongful life."' 64 However, children who are not born
do not know they could have been, and therefore, there is no harm
in preventing their birth.
Included in the state's interest are financial and social con-
cerns as well. The state has an interest in protecting the financial
well-being of a child. There is an inherent burden on taxpayers of
condoning children being born to single parents. When there is
only one parent to make money and care for the child, there are
fewer resources, both emotionally and financially. One person
does not have the same ability to care for a child, and at the same
time make as much money as two parents together can. "[V]arious
state interests, such as the interest in protecting the psychological
and financial well-being of the resulting child and the interest in
protecting state revenues must be weihed against the individual's
interest in reproducing after death."' A Michigan court has held
that the best interests of a child is sufficiently compelling to permit
governmental intervention. 166 Further, the state is concerned with
potential title and estate disputes that might develop. The state has
an interest in preventing estates that could go on indefinitely. It is
prudent for a state to prevent existing patterns of inheritance that
posthumous children would disrupt.
16
However, it is not likely the Supreme Court would consider
the right to reproduce posthumously a fundamental right, as ex-
plained above, therefore the state interest merely must be impor-
tant or legitimate. Under intermediate scrutiny or mid-level scru-
tiny, the means chosen by the state must be substantially related to
the important governmental interest. The Supreme Court has tradi-
tionally applied mid-level scrutiny to issues involving equal pro-
tection and gender-based discrimination claims. It is difficult to
determine how the Court will treat posthumous reproduction, but it
is unlikely it will be treated as a fundamental right, and therefore
the state interest does not have to be compelling. The above-
mentioned state interests should withstand mid-level scrutiny by
the Supreme Court, and the ban on posthumous reproduction will
likely be upheld.
11A Id. at 1040.
165 Schiff, supra note 79, at 904 (discussing legal and social policy questions
raised by posthumous reproduction).
166 See Schultz, supra note 25, at 280-81 (citing Doe v. Kelley, 307 N.W.2d 438
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981)).
167 See Steinbock, supra note 78, at 62 (presenting reasons why posthumous
offspring would disrupt existing patterns of inheritance).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Both men and women have an interest in posthumous repro-
duction by women. However, neither interest is strong enough to
outweigh child welfare interests in prohibiting the practice. There
are multiple alternatives for men who desire children. They can
adopt or they can remarry. The most important issue to keep in
mind is the resulting child. "Are there other alternatives that would
achieve the same goal of those who are alive that wouldn't raise
concerns?"168
It is imperative that reproductive technologies are monitored
in order to prevent crossing the line between assisting infertile
couples in having a child and manipulating the traditional notion
of reproduction. Originally, assisted reproductive techniques were
used to help families who were not able to have children natu-
rally.169 But for better or worse, medical advances have expanded
greatly beyond their original intention, and the legal issues must be
dealt with and decisions made.
It must be determined what the Supreme Court meant by the
right to bear and beget a child and whether that right extends to
posthumous reproduction. It does not appear a fundamental right
follows a person after his or hir death. There are some issues that
must be dealt with and hardships that must be faced in life. People
die, and often they die before they are able to procreate. But post-
humous procreation is not the answer to calming those sad feel-
ings. If the states do not intervene, medical advances will take over
and change society as we know it. Furthermore, the option of
having written consent documents is not a valid solution. 70 Cir-
cumstances change, people change, and people are extremely
emotional at the time of the death of a loved one. Also, with writ-
ten intentions, it is impossible to predict all possible outcomes. A
written document may omit what is to be done in the case of the
death of one or both partners, and then everything reverts to the
original issues presented in this Note.
'(' Collins, supra note 8, at El (discussing the repercussions of posthumous re-
production, including the production of parentless children and the possibility of
emotionally driven attempts to replace deceased relatives).
169 See Chester, supra note 63, at 971 (discussing societal values and assisted
conception during the early years of assisted reproduction science).
170 A lot of private clinics and hospitals have begun to have couples complete
consent forms prior to undergoing any assisted reproductive measures. These forms
include what the couple would like done with the reproductive materials in various
circumstances, such as when one or more of the parties dies. However, the validity of
these agreements has not yet been challenged in posthumous reproduction cases and
this topic is not explored in depth in this Note.
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Simply because a new technique is medically possible, it
does not mean it should be used under all circumstances, what-
ever the consequences. According to Laurence H. Tribe, profes-
sor of constitutional law at Harvard University, "I certainly
don't subscribe to the view that whatever technology permits us
to do we ought to do. Nor do I subscribe to the view that the
Constitution necessarily guarantees every individual the right to
reproduce through whatever means become technically possi-
ble."'17 1 Although it is difficult to define the parameters and
what should be banned and what should not, the negative results
of posthumous reproduction seem to outweigh the benefits.
Therefore, the only solution is a state-enacted ban on posthu-
mous reproduction, specifically by women.
171 Laurence H. Tribe, Law Professor Reconsiders Cloning, PLAIN DEALER, Dec.
9, 1997, at 9B (believing that more compelling reasons must be advanced to enforce
the ban on cloning).
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